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COMMENT
Trouble in the trough: how uncertainties were
downplayed in the UK’s science advice on Covid-19
Warren Pearce 1✉
The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has forced science advisory institutions and
processes into an unusually prominent role, and placed their decisions under
intense public, political and media scrutiny. In the UK, much of the focus has
been on whether the government was too late in implementing its lockdown
policy, resulting in thousands of unnecessary deaths. Some experts have argued
that this was the result of poor data being fed into epidemiological models in the
early days of the pandemic, resulting in inaccurate estimates of the virus’s
doubling rate. In this article, I argue that a fuller explanation is provided by an
analysis of how the multiple uncertainties arising from poor quality data, a
predictable characteristic of an emergency situation, were represented in the
advice to decision makers. Epidemiological modelling showed a wide range of
credible doubling rates, while the science advice based upon modelling pre-
sented a much narrower range of doubling rates. I explain this puzzle by showing
how some science advisors were both knowledge producers (through epide-
miological models) and knowledge users (through the development of advice),
roles associated with different perceptions of scientific uncertainty. This con-
flation of experts’ roles gave rise to contradictions in the representation of
uncertainty over the doubling rate. Role conflation presents a challenge to sci-
ence advice, and highlights the need for a diversity of expertise, a structured
process for selecting experts, and greater clarity regarding the methods by which
expert consensus is achieved. The analysis indicates an urgent research agenda
that can help strengthen the UK science advice system after Covid-19.
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Introduction
T
he 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has forced science advisory
institutions and processes into an unusually prominent
role, and placed their decisions under intense public,
political and media scrutiny. In the UK, a key controversy has
centred on whether the government was too late in implementing
its lockdown policy, resulting in thousands of unnecessary deaths,
and the role of advice provided by the government’s Scientific
Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), a group of experts
drawn from government, academia and industry (SAGE, 2020a).
In this article, I highlight how uncertainties in the virus doubling
rate—an important input into lockdown decision-making—were
downplayed in both the advice provided by SAGE and public
comments by SAGE participants. Previous research has shown
how knowledge producers perceive high uncertainty, whereas
knowledge users perceive less uncertainty (MacKenzie, 1990), an
issue particularly problematic for government science advice
where differentiating between knowledge production and use may
be challenging (Jasanoff, 2003). In the case of UK Covid-19
advice, the conflation of knowledge production and knowledge
use has accompanied experts downplaying the uncertainty within
their own models as they provided advice to decision makers.
The consideration of policy options thus became anchored in a
consensus that Covid-19 cases were doubling every five days, as
opposed to the results of scientific modelling that showed dou-
bling rates as low as three days were also credible. This failure to
consider the full range of credible values for doubling rates pro-
jected an unwarranted sense of certainty to decision-makers and
the public regarding the spread of the virus, and potentially
helped to delay the implementation of a lockdown policy.
Knowledge production, knowledge use and uncertainty
perception
In June 2020, as the UK started to wind down its lockdown
measures in response to Covid-19, some prominent SAGE par-
ticipants reflected on the timing of the policy’s introduction.
Professor Neil Ferguson1 stated that enforcing lockdown a week
earlier could have halved the death rate (Stewart and Sample,
2020), Professor John Edmunds expressed regret that the delay
“cost a lot of lives” (UK Lockdown Delay Cost a Lot of Lives-
Scientist, 2020), a position supported by fellow SAGE participant
and Royal Society President Sir Venki Ramakrishnan (Today,
2020). Both Ferguson and Edmunds pinpointed a paucity of data
as the key reason for the delay to lockdown (Johns, 2020; UK
Lockdown Delay Cost a Lot of Lives-Scientist, 2020). However,
there is more to the lockdown controversy than the important,
but unsurprising, challenges of data availability and validation
(Marcus and Oransky, 2020; Rutter et al., 2020). The more fun-
damental issue for science advisory systems is how to deal with
the multiple uncertainties that inevitably arise from poor data, a
topic of enduring interest in the science and technology studies
(STS) and science advice literature. (Cassidy, 2019; Funtowicz and
Ravetz, 1993; Landström et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2018; Raman,
2015; SAPEA, 2019; Stilgoe et al., 2006; Stirling, 2010; Wesselink
and Hoppe, 2010). Here, I focus on one aspect of science advice’s
’uncertainty monster’ (van der Sluijs, 2005), the tensions between
knowledge production and knowledge use.
One of the most influential studies of scientific uncertainty was
provided three decades ago by Donald MacKenzie (1990) in
Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile
Guidance. MacKenzie outlined three broad positions which
formed a ‘certainty trough’ related to the perception of uncer-
tainty in knowledge production and use. First, those directly
involved in knowledge production, such as scientific modellers,
are keenly aware of the uncertainties in that knowledge. Second,
users of said knowledge are likely to perceive less uncertainty,
believing, as MacKenzie puts it, ‘what the brochures tell them’.
Third, those people alienated from knowledge production and
use, or committed to a different technology, will have the highest
perception of uncertainty. When represented schematically, this
relationship resembles a trough, as shown in Figure 1 (MacK-
enzie, 1990, p. 372).
This concept has become influential in STS, with the impli-
cation that different actors reside in different points along the
trough depending on their whether they are knowledge producers
or users. Sheila Jasanoff proposes that expert reviewers of gov-
ernment science fall within the intermediate zone of reduced
scepticism, while also noting the challenge of achieving both
familiarity with the subject matter and distance from the scien-
tists involved (2006, p. 34). In a subsequent study of climate
modellers, Myanna Lahsen (2005) highlights how the boundary
between model developer and model user can become blurred,
leading to a situation where knowledge producers become
‘seduced’ by their own models. Lahsen uses this insight to argue
for a differently shaped ‘trough’, with uncertainty perception
actually at its lowest amongst those directly involved in knowl-
edge production (2005, p. 918). However, I argue that in the case
of UK Covid-19 advice, the conflation of knowledge production
and use does not imply a differently shaped relationship. Instead,
key experts occupy different positions on MacKenzie’s trough
according to their priorities at any given moment rather than
remaining fixed in one place. These conflated roles point both to
the challenge of navigating the ‘hybridity’ that forms an inherent
part of science advice (Palmer et al., 2019), and the importance of
effective review procedures being built into science advisory
systems (Jasanoff, 2003). In the next section, I provide a brief
overview of Covid-19 advice in the UK, and raise questions
regarding the membership of advisory groups.
Diversity and scrutiny in the UK science advice system
SAGE (Scientific Advice to Government in Emergencies) has
overall responsibility for coordinating and peer reviewing the
scientific advice that informs decision-making (Civil Con-
tingencies Secretariat, 2012, p. 2), and is part of a science advice
system that takes in multiple sub-groups (see Table 1).
At the time of writing, the UK Government’s information on
SAGE does not detail criteria for the selection of experts parti-
cipating within the system, other than them being from health-
care and academia, and that sub-groups “consider the scientific
evidence and feed in their consensus conclusions to SAGE” (HM
Government, 2020a). However, the processes behind these
remain somewhat opaque. On membership, the guidance for
high
u
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
low
Knowledge
producer
Knowledge
user
Alienated from
instuons
Fig. 1 The ‘certainty trough’ shows a non-linear relationship between
proximity to knowledge and perception of uncertainty. Adapted from
MacKenzie (1990, p. 372; 1998, p. 325).
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SAGE states that the experts appointed should be the most
appropriate rather than the most accessible, but not how that is to
be determined (Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 2012, p. 19). On
consensus, no mechanism is discussed for resolving expert dis-
agreement, other than to note that reaching consensus may not
always be possible and that a statement should be made on “the
extent and sources of uncertainty” (Civil Contingencies Secre-
tariat, 2012, p. 47).
This lack of clarity was exacerbated by an early decision not to
disclose the identities of expert advisers, in order to protect them
from “lobbying and other forms of unwanted influence” (Val-
lance, 2020). This caused controversy over a perceived lack of
transparency and accountability, leading to pressure from
Members of Parliament and the eventual publication of a leaked
participant list by The Guardian on April 24th (Carrell et al.,
2020; Mason, 2020a). On May 4th, the names of participants
within all advisory groups were published by government
(Government Office for Science, 2020; Mason, 2020b). Analysis of
this list shows a total of 17 experts participating in three or four
advisory groups (see Table 2).
That some experts appear on more than one committee is
perhaps unsurprising, not least because Cabinet Office guidance
recommends that at least one member of each sub-group should
attend SAGE in order to enable two-way communication (Civil
Contingencies Secretariat, 2012, p. 15). However, the guidance
also notes that SAGE “should not overly rely on specific experts”
(Cabinet Office, 2012, p. 19; original emphasis). Such a principle
is important for the consideration of a full range of expert views
in the process of consensus-formation, as well as ensuring that
the available evidence can be scrutinised by experts beyond those
directly involved in its production (Freedman, 2020b; Jasanoff,
2003). That Professor Ian Boyd joined SAGE in April 2020 to
provide an “independent challenge function” suggests an aware-
ness within the science advice system of a need for greater
diversity and scrutiny (Freedman, 2020a). In the next section, I
highlight the importance of these issues through the representa-
tion of uncertainty within advice on the Covid-19 doubling rate.
The doubling rate: from multiple uncertainties to a single
number
Two leading groups of epidemiological modellers from Imperial
College London and London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine (LSHTM) were closely involved in the early science
advice provided to the UK government for Covid-19. As shown in
Table 1, LSHTM’s Edmunds is a member of four groups within
the science advice system, including SAGE (Government Office
for Science, 2020). While LSHTM’s work has not been as high-
profile as that from Ferguson’s Imperial group, it features reg-
ularly in the published minutes of SAGE, and their scientists are
prominent media contributors. While the modelling reports
provided to SAGE during February and March are yet to be
published, a version of the LSHTM group’s work has been peer
reviewed and published in The Lancet Public Health (LPH)
(Davies et al., 2020).2 In this article they provide an estimate of R0
(the number of people infected by a single case, in a situation
where everyone is susceptible) as 2.7, but state that it could also
credibly be as high as 3.9. This is notable for two reasons. First,
Table 1 Descriptions of SAGE and related sub-groups (Government Office for Science, 2020; HM Government, 2020b).
Group Function
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) Provides scientific and technical advice to support government decision makers during
emergencies
Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Behaviours (SPI-B) Provides advice aimed at anticipating and helping people adhere to interventions that are
recommended by medical or epidemiological experts
Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) Gives expert advice to the UK government on scientific matters relating to the UK’s
response to an influenza pandemic (or other emerging human infectious disease threats).
The advice is based on infectious disease modelling and epidemiology
PHE Serology Working Group Provides oversight of sero-epidemiology work for COVID-19 in England and partners with
international colleagues, including the WHO, on these serological studies
COVID-19 Clinical Information Network (CO-CIN) Collates clinical information from the usual health care records of people of all ages
admitted to hospital in the UK to characterise the clinical features of patients with severe
COVID-19 in the UK
Environmental Working Group Identifies and steers the role that environmental modelling, data analysis and
environmental sampling can play in understanding COVID-19 transmission
Children’s Task and Finish Working Group Provides consolidated scientific health advice to government on the transmission of
COVID-19 in children and within schools
Hospital Onset COVID-19 Working Group Provides thought leadership, direction to analysis and precipitates policy change and
interventions that lead to a rapid and sustained reduction in the rate of hospital-onset
COVID-19 infection
New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory
Group (NERVTAG)
Advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory viruses
Table 2 List of experts participating in three or more groups
within the UK science advice system, as of May 4th, 2020.
Expert Number of groups as participant
Professor Peter Horby 4
Professor Lucy Yardley 4
Professor John Edmunds 4
Professor Graham Medley 4
Professor Cath Noakes 4
Dr James Rubin 4
Professor Wendy Barclay 3
Professor Sharon Peacock 3
Professor Russell Viner 3
Professor Neil Ferguson 3
Professor Julia Gog 3
Professor Dame Theresa Marteau 3
Professor Charlotte Watts 3
Professor Calum Semple 3
Professor Brooke Rogers 3
Dr Ellen Brooks-Pollock 3
Dr Edwin Van Leeuwen 3
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these values for R0 are considerably higher than those in the
Imperial College report that was reportedly pivotal in the gov-
ernment’s move to more stringent interventions and, ultimately,
lockdown policies (Landler and Castle, 2020). Imperial modelled
R0 as between 2.0–2.6, with a central assumption of 2.4 (Ferguson
et al., 2020). In other words, the highest value modelled by the
Imperial group was below the central estimate of LSHTM. 3
Second, despite the wide range of possible R0 values identified in
the LPH article, and the divergence from estimates provided by
Imperial, public pronouncements by science advisers focused on a
single number for the doubling rate of the virus. Providing a
single number for the doubling rate relies not only on having a
firm grasp of a figure for R0, but also the time elapsed between
infectiousness in a primary case and a secondary case. This was
perhaps an impossible task in the early stages of the virus, where a
paucity of data meant societies were “living in a moment of
ground-zero empiricism …[with] basic facts yet to be ascer-
tained” (Daston, 2020). Some modelling experts from outside the
epidemiological community have countered such perspectives,
argued that government science advisers should have paid more
attention to early case data from the UK and other European
countries (Annan and Hargreaves, 2020). While such efforts to
improve the quality of model simulations are clearly important,
there is a broader point that requires attention: that the multiple
uncertainties inherent in trying to model the virus’s spread
should be reflected in the scientific advice given to decision
makers. Based on the evidence published in the scientific litera-
ture and by government, this does not seem to have happened in
the UK case.
Defending the number
On March 13th, Edmunds appeared in a feisty Channel 4 News
interview with Tomas Pueyo, a commentator with no apparent
scientific credentials but who had written the viral Medium story
“Why You Must Act Now” recommending immediate imple-
mentation of lockdown in order to minimise death rates (Pearce,
2020; Pueyo, 2020). At the end of the interview, Pueyo made the
case, based on the increasing number of cases in the UK, that
cases were more than doubling every three days. Edmunds dis-
puted this saying (de Pear and Cacace, 2020, 23m17s):
“it’s true that if you look crudely at the numbers, then the
cases are doubling every 2.5 days, but that’s because they
are doing more contact tracing. The actual underlying rate
of doubling is actually about every five days”.
The claim here is that because the UK was conducting a lot of
tests, this was increasing the number of cases being detected, and
so making it appear that the virus was spreading more quickly
than it was. Investigating this claim is beyond the scope of this
article, but what is clear is that the influence of testing rates on
doubling rate calculations introduces a further, potentially
important, source of uncertainty in estimating the rate at which
Covid-19 cases were increasing. A responsible way of dealing with
this would be to emphasise the range of potential values involved
which, as described in the LPH article, could credibly have been
closer to three days than five. Three days after the Channel 4
News programme, on March 16th, the minutes of the SAGE
meeting echoed Edmunds’ claim, reporting that UK cases “may
be doubling ever 5–6 days” (SAGE, 2020c, p. 2). Later that day,
the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance,
also stated that he expected the epidemic to double “every five
days or so” (BBC News, 2020, 27m47s). A week later, on March
23rd, the consensus on five days was broken, with SAGE meeting
minutes reporting a doubling time of 3–4 days (SAGE,
2020b, p. 2).
The presentation of doubling time as reasonably certain is
puzzling. Both Vallance and Edmunds are esteemed scientists
who were surely aware of the inherent uncertainties within the
models. Returning to MacKenzie’s certainty trough, one would
expect Edmunds in particular, as a knowledge producer, to be
highly perceptive of the uncertainties. Indeed, the LPH article on
which Edmunds is a co-author demonstrates such perception. So,
what is going on? My argument is that this is a case of science
misreporting that stems from the conflated roles of key experts in
the UK science advice system. In the LPH article, Edmunds fulfils
his primary role as a knowledge producer through epidemiolo-
gical models, providing a detailed account of the uncertainties in
the LSHTM group’s research. However, his participation in SAGE
and other advisory groups also casts him in the role of knowledge
user: translating the outputs of his team’s scientific models into
advice. This shows that not only is it possible for an expert to
occupy different points on the certainty trough at different times,
(see Fig. 2) but that this is a likely result of the close relationship
between knowledge production and knowledge use within science
advice.
The humility of Edmunds and other advisers regarding the
overdue implementation of lockdown is welcome and should
provide an example to the UK’s political leaders, if public trust is
to be maintained. However, the point of this article is not to
highlight individuals, but to open up a dialogue about the
structure of the UK’s science advice system and how it came to
downplay the multiple uncertainties that seemed obvious to many
external observers (Cookson and Mancini, 2020). If data pro-
blems in the crucial early days of the pandemic were as acute as
science advisers now claim, then the consensus that formed
around a doubling rate of five days becomes even less defensible.
Instead, poor data availability should have prompted uncertain-
ties to be emphasised rather than downplayed. This in turn could
have opened up a wider range of policy options, and at least put
on the agenda the rapid lockdown policy which some SAGE
participants subsequently wished for (Pielke, 2007).
The future of science advice
This article has analysed the representation of uncertainty
regarding the virus doubling rate, a key area of controversy in UK
science advice, finding contradictions between the outputs from
epidemiological models and their public representation. In par-
ticular, I have shown how the doubling rate was represented as
relatively certain despite the presence of three significant sources
of uncertainty: the R0 number, the time elapsed between infec-
tiousness in a primary case and a secondary case, and the influ-
ence of increased testing on doubling rate calculations. This
article has been written within six months of the events described,
so the analysis is necessarily provisional. However, there are three
Fig. 2 A science advisor can occupy different points in the ‘certainty trough’
depending on their role at a given time. Adapted from MacKenzie (1990,
p. 372; 1998, p. 325).
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important findings: first, that the science advice system presented
the virus doubling rate with unwarranted certainty; second, that
role conflation in science advisers between knowledge production
and knowledge use helps to explain the downplaying of uncer-
tainties; and, third, that these issues highlight the need for
diversity and clarity in the selection of experts and the means by
which consensus in advice is achieved. None of this is straight-
forward to navigate, with trite slogans such as “follow the science”
telling us nothing about the tricky business of producing and
using scientific knowledge to inform decision-making (Bacevic,
2020). Rather, the unprecedented stress test of Covid-19 provides
an important opportunity to learn lessons and strengthen the
science advice system in preparation for future emergencies
(Obermeister, 2020).
Two US-based projects, CompCoRe4 and EScAPE5, are starting
to build an evidence base, comparing science advice and policy
responses across multiple countries. However, more detailed
national-level research is urgently required in the UK and else-
where. This article indicates numerous potential lines of enquiry
including: the relationship between medical classification and
political imaginaries (Liddiard, 2020; Perego et al., 2020), cultural
influences on the representation of uncertainty (Douglas, 2016;
Stirling and Scoones, 2020), diversity and consensus within sci-
ence advice (Leach and Scoones, 2013; Smallman, 2020a), the
staging of science advice at press conferences (Hilgartner, 2000;
Hollin and Pearce, 2015), the role of blogs and social media in
challenges to established science (Raman and Pearce, 2020;
Turner, 2013), the emerging demand for alternative science
advice such as “Independent SAGE” (Smallman, 2020b; Wise,
2020) and how scientific emergencies such as Covid-19 affect
public trust in experts (Dommett and Pearce, 2019).
Such a research agenda is wide-ranging and challenging. Yet the
analysis presented here reminds us that science advice is literally a
matter of life-and-death. The ultimate responsibility for decision
remains on politicians, but there is responsibility too on experts to
reflect on whether the scientific advice provided on Covid-19
served the public good. The colossal toll of death, damage and
despair left behind by the pandemic demands nothing less.
Received: 19 June 2020; Accepted: 24 September 2020;
Notes
1 While Ferguson was not a member of SAGE at the time of this statement, he was a key
SAGE participant between January and March 2020.
2 The authors report that while the results within the LPH article are updated from their
reports provided to government, the overall conclusions “are the same as those
presented to decision makers in real time” (2020, p. e383).
3 On March 25th, a paper to SAGE estimated a reproduction number of 2.8 under a
reasonable worse-case scenario (Planning Assumptions for the UK Reasonable Worst
Case Scenario (Draft), 2020).
4 https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2020/05/hilgartner-study-global-covid-19-policies-nsf-
grant.
5 http://escapecovid19.org/.
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